Monday, December 29, 2008

The Philosophical Method(s)

Philosophy always was about answering questions, although it is quite difficult to say what kind of questions philosophy is in the business of trying to answer. Perhaps some sort of metaphilosophy is required, but whatever, that is not the subject of this post. Philosophy is an attempt to find answers to certain kinds of questions, and always was.

Over time, however, it was discovered that certain questions could be posed in such a way that answers could methodically be found, and thus the sciences were born (i.e. natural philosophy). This breakaway includes the "hard" and "soft" sciences, as well as the mathematical sciences; but this post is not about them. This post is about what remains, those leftover kinds of questions for which there exists no such methodical way of finding or determining the correctness of proposed answers... philosophy proper.

Of course, philosophy does have its methods. And, like natural philosophy, it does have questions, along with proposed answers. But unlike natural philosophy, the bridge from question to answer is neither empirical nor logical. So-called "analytic" philosophy is all too concerned with the attack and defense of theses, and in the process forgets to say much in the way of actually supporting theses, where "support" just means what gets a person to actually believe the thesis. Analytic philosophy, with its hack-and-slash "all the other theses are wrong so mine must be right" approach is sorely lacking in this regard.

A proper philosophical method should gently guide the inquisitor in their thought processes, crossing the bridge from question to answer. Wittgenstein attempted to do this in his latter years, but was quite brutish about it. Rather than gently guiding, he poked and prodded, and hoped the reader would take the correct steps on their own. The best philosophical methods could best be described as "gentle guides to crossing conceptual bridges".

But here I have made an error; one which must be resolved post-haste. I have conflated the finding of answers with getting others to see the veracity of those answers.

In general, scientists formulate hypotheses after careful observation, using a hybrid inductive-intuitive process, for while observation and induction play an important role in scientific hypothesis formulation, it is intuition that bridges the final gap between observation and explanation. And while logic and mathematics seem to offer clear paths to their answers, computational complexity requires brilliant intuition to find a clear path amongst an infinite number of false starts. Philosophers, on the other hand, have nothing but intuition.

Thus, in philosophy proper, we have two methods: pure intuition for finding answers, and gently guiding others to see the veracity of those answers.

Wednesday, October 22, 2008

Never too busy to Think

Yeah, I've been busy lately... but I'm still philosophizing.

Sunday, July 27, 2008

Bread and Butter

Even philosophers need to eat, so I took a job as a Child Welfare Specialist with the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS). It's been a little over a month now, and I love it. You can read about what I do here (I work in Permanency Planning).

I would also like to take this opportunity to mention that foster families are in short supply, so if you have what it takes to be a foster parent, please do! Click here for more info.

So why child welfare? Well, I did not choose it "because I love children". I have two children of my own, and I love them, but I have no special love for children in general. Rather, I took this job out of a general concern for the future well-being of mankind. And because I need to eat.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Whither the Beginning?

Wittgenstein said: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back"

But where is the beginning? Language and behavior? Experience? The primordial world?

There cannot be language and behavior without experience. (is that supposed to be a substantive hypothesis?) There cannot be experience without a primordial world (i.e. a world that is mind-independent). But we cannot talk about (or describe) the world without taking the world as we experience it as a given. But then we are not talking about a primordial world at all...

Here we have found a philosopher's Gordian knot.

It might be best to begin with what we say and do. Nevertheless, it is tempting to take the world as we experience it to be the beginning for all we say and do. And yet there is something enlightening in going beyond that. Or further back.

But all the while we must not forget that the mind is part of the world (i.e. not independent of it). The world as we experience it is mind-dependent, and that is all we can describe. The primordial world is mind-independent, and cannot be described. But isn't the mind part of the primordial world? Mustn't it be? (This question contains a conceptual error, but there is something correct about it).

Yet all the while there is only one world, not two. There is no beginning — we cannot go "further back" because there is no logical way to order our conceptions here. We must jump right in, and wrestle with this Gordian knot.

Saturday, June 21, 2008

This is Life

Trials and Tribulations: Life is a test to see if you are worthy of going to some sort of paradise, where you will live forever.

Reincarnation: You get to try over and over again until you finally get it right, and then you get to go to some sort of paradise, where you will live forever.

Atheism: You only get one life, and it is not a test. You will die. Live accordingly.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

What Russell did for Wittgenstein

You don't have to be stupid to be incapable of independent thinking — academia is awash with such people.

Those who are incapable of thinking independently are incapable of recognizing anything that is both novel and important. First they must be told, by someone whom they already deem to be of some importance, that such-and-such is important, and that they should pay attention. That is what Russell did for Wittgenstein.

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

The Problem with Analytic Philosophy

Explanations are meant to be understood — but by whom? Many scientific explanations can be readily grasped by the masses, at least intuitively (e.g. Newtonian mechanics). And even where this is not possible, at least science produces results. But what can be said about analytic philosophy? It neither makes any sense to the masses, nor does it produce any results. And while it may be understood by the analytic philosophers, they are so steeped in confusion that it can hardly be called an "explanation" of anything. What is it then? A game?

I like to think of analytic philosophy as being a lot like chess. And while I very much like chess, I am not here to play games.

Random Thoughts and Word-Salad

Here I say whatever is currently on my mind, without ever supposing that I've got it quite right. Nevertheless, perhaps you can see what I'm aiming at...

Ugh

There are those who would have philosophy be like a science: the so-called "analytic philosophers".

Monday, June 16, 2008

Method

What? Am I saying that there is no single method for doing philosophy? No, I am saying that there is no systematic method for arriving at a philosophical explanation.

Sunday, June 15, 2008

What Philosophy Is(n't)

Philosophy is like science in that both seek to provide explanations. And explanations facilitate understanding. But philosophy is not a science, because with philosophy there is no method — there is only explanation.

Monday, June 2, 2008

Purpose and Value

Teleological thinking (that things have a purpose) is a useful heuristic, and a related view is that certain things have intrinsic value. Both are psychological phenomena that should not be taken too seriously, and both can be harmful when they impinge upon an autonomous agent (an entity having perceptions, beliefs, desires, and the ability to act on them).

Purpose and value come into the world with agency, they do not precede it.

Monday, May 26, 2008

Nostalgia

From The American Heritage Dictionary (quoted from dictionary.com):

1. A bittersweet longing for things, persons, or situations of the past.

From Dictionary.com:

1. a wistful desire to return in thought or in fact to a former time in one's life, to one's home or homeland, or to one's family and friends; a sentimental yearning for the happiness of a former place or time: a nostalgia for his college days.



The past is no less real than the present; it is a real time with real things, persons, and situations. But the important thing to remember about the past is that you can't get there from here. And the things, persons, and situations you can get to from here are quite different from the ones remembered so fondly. One cannot return "in fact" to what one is longing for — it is simply impossible.

Of course, one can return in thought. The interesting thing is that one counldn't even want to return "in fact" if one could not return "in thought" (you have to think it to want it in this sense). And the queer thing about human psychology is that if we can think it, we can want it. Even if it is impossible.

Thursday, May 22, 2008

What Philosophy Is(n't)

Philosophy is not the answering of empirical questions, although sometimes it involves the creation of a systematic way of answering them. And often it involves the displaying of a confusion underlying the formation of certain questions.

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Leaving Graduate School

I'm leaving graduate school with a Master's degree in philosophy, and without going into too much detail, I'd like to explain why: It simply is not possible, having a wife and two kids, to both develop my own philosophical thought and jump through hoops. I'll take the former over the latter anytime.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Metaphysical Nonsense

"Reference", as a relation between the mind and the world, is just as bogus as ESP.

Friday, April 11, 2008

The Problem with Analytic Philosophy

They forgot that paradigm shifts occur in philosophy too.

Sunday, April 6, 2008

Think Longer and Harder

There are always objections that can be raised. Most of these will be trivial and easily overcome (see this post). Others will be more substantive, but again can be overcome, perhaps with a bit of tweaking. But a real objection is one that undermines the whole project. These sorts of objections are not easily found, although they are always devastating. And the odd thing about them is that they are always quite simple (the mark of a good objection: simple and devastating).

Speaking Philosophically

It is quite difficult to say something philosophical without sounding stupid. And yes, a lot of what philosophers say borders on the idiotic.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Philosophical Etiquette

"I don't understand what you mean" is not, under any circumstances, an appropriate response to a philosophical question/statement.

An example of an appropriate response would be: "I'm not quite sure I understand — do you mean... in which case..."

Epistemology

I am thoroughly convinced that the primary use of the word 'knowledge' is in making value judgments regarding beliefs, and that epistemology is rightly seen as being part of value-theory.

Thursday, January 17, 2008

Saturday, January 5, 2008

Conceptual Leaps and Bounds

You're supposed to think it through, and figure it out for yourself.

Of course, I think this is all very clever.

Tuesday, January 1, 2008

Meaning Externalism

It is a simple matter to conceive of myself as being a brain in a vat. I know what that is, and I know what it would mean for me to be one.

You chuckle. And mention Putnam.

But is there any reason why we shouldn't construe Putnam's argument as constituting a reductio ad absurdum of meaning externalism? I mean, any reason other than the fact that Putnam didn't mean for it to be, despite the fact that it is.